Uruguay which concerned the latter's implementation of certain measures to curb the consumption of tobacco products in its country but which Philip Morris construed as an expropriation of its trademarks. The second is the dispute between Eli Lilly and Canada which concerned the interpretation of the utility requirement under Canadian patent law. These cases will be used to assess whether there is still scope for the preservation of the principle of territoriality within the investor-state dispute settlement system.
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Introduction
The principle of territoriality is one of the foundational principles of International Intellectual Property Law (IIPL). 1 According to the principle of territoriality, intellectual property rights are limited to the territory of the country where they have been granted. 2 The principle of territoriality permits states to tailor their national intellectual property laws to suit their level of technological and economic development. In other words, pursuant to the principle of territoriality, countries can design their intellectual property laws in a manner that facilitates the achievement of specific societal goals such as encouraging the development of home-grown industries or protecting public health. Despite increased globalisation and the growth of international agreements dealing with intellectual property rights, the principle of territoriality is still regarded as a basic tenet of IIPL.
The principle of territoriality in International Law has its roots in the emergence of nation-states and this emergence is typically attributed to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 3 although, as a concept in political theory, territory predates the 17th century. 4 The history of intellectual property rights, at least from a Euro-centric perspective, is inextricably linked with territoriality. The international protection of technological property has been governed by three interdependent principles: 1) territoriality of protection; 2) national treatment of foreign owners of national intellectual property; and 3) international minimum protection."). Lundstedt notes, "the origin of IP rights, in particular patent and copyright, is usually traced back to the privileges granted by the European sovereigns from the time of the 15th century" and these "privileges were expressly limited to a specific territory under the control of the sovereign." 6 It is noteworthy that these privileges have historically been regarded as instruments of "public policy regulation to control and monitor particular industries." 7 In other words, these privileges were utilised by sovereigns to achieve specific societal goals within their territories. 8 The international intellectual property system evolved in response to the principle of territoriality. As a result of increased cross-border trade, states began to enter into bilateral treaties to protect intellectual property rights of their citizens abroad While both the Paris and Berne Conventions are the first multilateral treaties on intellectual property rights, they still preserved the principle of territoriality and member states were largely permitted to design their national intellectual property laws in a manner that suits their needs and interests as long 6 Ibid., pp. 73-74. 7 Ibid., p. 73. Lundstedt, supra n. 2, p. 85. 10 Peter Drahos, "Intellectual Property and Human Rights" (1999) The incorporation of intellectual property into the international investment law system and the assetization of intellectual property can affect the principle of territoriality in at least two ways. Firstly, free trade agreements (especially where it is an agreement between a developed country and a developing country) typically include provisions requiring the parties to implement standards that are above and beyond the minimum requirements of the TRIPS Agreements or which eliminates a flexibility available to a WTO member under the TRIPS Agreement (typically referred to as TRIPS-plus provisions).
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Where an agreement expressly contains such TRIPS-plus provisions, it can curtail the ability of a party to design its national intellectual property laws in a manner that allows it to achieve specific societal goals. 18 It is however possible to incorporate specific provisions into a bilateral investment treaty or a free trade agreement that recognises a country's policy space and preserves its regulatory powers with regard to intellectual property. However, this paper only focuses on the aspects of the existing ISDS system that can negatively affect the principle of territoriality in IIPL and two of these are discussed below.
Firstly, as Frankel points out, there is an incongruence between the object and purpose of protecting intellectual property and the object and purpose of 28 See, Dreyfuss and Frankel, "From Incentive to Commodity to Asset", supra n. 12, p.571 (noting that, "once assetization is realized through successive negotiations over IP, investment treaties and investment chapters in free trade agreements become significant for lurking within them are provisions defining IP as assets and a mechanism-investor-state arbitration-that protects these assets from direct or indirect expropriation and guarantees investors fair and equitable treatment."). 29 The ISDS system has been criticised for the lack of consistency in the decisions generated via the system as it has neither binding precedents nor an appellate system. In addition, it has also been criticised for its lack of transparency and its potential to produce decisions that might be inconsistent with other international dispute settlement systems such as the WTO dispute settlement system. See generally, Ho, "Sovereignty under Siege", supra n. 15, pp. 234, 250. to design its national intellectual property laws in a way that enables it to achieve specific societal goals.
Secondly, the ability of investment tribunals to consider the broader public interest when resolving investment disputes has also been called into question. 35 Frankel contends that "there is scant evidence that many investment 32 See generally, Frankel, "Interpreting the Overlap", supra n. 15, p. 139 (noting that, "At its bluntest, the objects and purposes of international IP … and the object and purpose of investment agreements are not the same."). 33 Dreyfuss and Frankel, "From Incentive to Commodity to Asset", supra n. 12, p. 572. 34 This has serious implications for investment disputes involving intellectual property rights as a country may decide, in the public interest, to introduce specific measures relating to intellectual property rights in a bid to achieve specific societal goals such as protecting public health.
In determining whether there is still scope for the preservation of the principle of territoriality in IIPL within the ISDS system, the two issues identified above will be used as a metric to critically assess the decisions of the tribunals in Philip Morris and Eli Lilly in parts three and four respectively. In other words, how did these tribunals deal with the incongruence between the object and purpose of protecting intellectual property and the object and purpose of protecting investment assets? Did these tribunals give any weight to public interest considerations in their decisions?
Philip Morris v Uruguay
In order to reduce the consumption of tobacco products in its country, the Uruguay government implemented a number of measures including the "single presentation requirement" (SPR) 37 and the "80/80" regulation.
38
The SPR permits the sale of only one variant of cigarette per brand family i.e. it prohibits the sale of more than one variant of the same brand of cigarette. The 80/80 regulation requires health warnings on 80% of both sides of cigarette packs, leaving only interest are inherently involved in investor-state disputes. And yet, the current arbitration model is ill-equipped to address these wider issues."). 36 Frankel, "Interpreting the Overlap", supra n. 15, p. 125. Uruguay however contended that the measures were a legitimate exercise of its sovereign police power (i.e. regulatory power) 42 and the measures were adopted solely for the purpose of protecting public health and not interference with foreign investment. 43 According to Uruguay, the SPR was adopted to reduce the negative consequences of the promotion of tobacco such as the false marketing by the claimants that certain brand variants are safer than other brand variants. 44 In addition, Uruguay contended that the 80/80 regulation was adopted to heighten the awareness of consumers about the health risks associated with the consumption of tobacco and to encourage its citizens, including young people, to stop or not start smoking tobacco. 45 Uruguay also contended that Article 5 of the bilateral investment treaty should be interpreted in accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on 42 Ibid., para. 181. 43 Ibid., para. 13. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. law in its interpretation of a treaty. 46 According to Uruguay, "the police powers doctrine is a fundamental rule of customary international law and as such, it must be applied to interpret Article 5, in accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties." 47 In this regard, Philip Morris contended, among other things, that a state's regulatory measure must be subject to limitations and that, even if the measures were adopted to protect public health, they were still expropriatory because they were unreasonable. 48 In its decision, the tribunal ruled in favour of Uruguay (although there was a dissenting judgment from one of the arbitrators).
49
As this was not a case involving the direct expropriation of an investment asset, a key question for the tribunal was whether the measures implemented by Uruguay were an indirect expropriation of the claimants' asset.
50
According to the tribunal, in order to constitute indirect expropriation, "the government's measures interference with the investor's rights must have a major adverse impact on the Claimants' investments." 51 The tribunal ruled that there was no indirect expropriation and that the measures implemented by Uruguay were a valid exercise of state police powers to protect public health. 52 As noted in part two above, the two issues 46 identified in part two will be used as a metric to determine whether the tribunal's decision indicates that there is any scope for the preservation of the principle of territoriality within the ISDS system.
The incongruence resulting from treating trademarks as both an investment asset and as an intellectual property right
In relation to the first issue i.e. the incongruence between the object and purpose of protecting intellectual property and the object and purpose of protecting investment assets, the tribunal's approach to the interpretation of the nature of the rights conferred on Philip Morris by virtue of its trademarks is highly instructive. In this case, the trademarks (which Philip Morris claimed had been expropriated as a result of the measures implemented by Uruguay) were both simultaneously intellectual property rights and investment assets. 53 One crucial question that the tribunal had to answer in this regard was whether Philip
Morris' trademarks were capable of being expropriated. Philip Morris contended that it had the "right to use" its trademarks in commerce and thus it could be expropriated while Uruguay contended that trademark owners only have a negative "right to exclude" third parties from using their trademarks and not an affirmative "right to use" them.
54
According to Uruguay, Philip Morris had no rights that could be expropriated since trademarks only confer a negative right to exclude.
55
In deciding this issue, the tribunal looked beyond the bilateral investment treaty and considered the nature of the right conferred on trademark owners 53 As noted by the tribunal, "It is undisputed that trademarks and goodwill associated with the use of trademarks are protected investments under Article 1(2)(d) of the BIT." Ibid., para. 235. Elsewhere, the tribunal referred to the trademarks as "intellectual property assets." Ibid., para. 273. 54 Ibid., paras. 168, 181. 55 Ibid., para. 181. The tribunal's analysis did not however stop here. In the tribunal's view, rather than frame the issue as one between a right to use and a right to exclude third parties, it is better to frame the issue as a choice between an absolute versus exclusive right to use. 58 According to the tribunal:
Ownership of a trademark does, in certain circumstances, grant a right to use it. It is a right of use that exists vis-à-vis other persons, an exclusive right, but a relative one. It is not an absolute right to use that can be asserted against the State qua regulator. 59 Thus, while recognising that there is no provision under international trademark law that expressly confers a right to use a trademark on the owner, the tribunal adopted the view that the ownership of a trademark could in certain cases confer a right to use it. It should be noted that there is a divergence of opinion on this issue amongst scholars. Some scholars hold to the view, canvassed by Uruguay in this case, that trademark owners only have a negative right to exclude third parties from using their trademarks.
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Other scholars such 56 Ibid., paras. 260-262. 57 Ibid., para. 262. 58 Ibid., para. 267. 59 in connection with the relevant goods and services of its own and authorized undertakings. 64 It will thus appear that even though there is no express provision in the TRIPS Agreement conferring a right to use on trademark owners, this does not mean that trademark owners do not have a legitimate interest in using their trademarks in commerce. The tribunal however did not deem it necessary to consider whether trademark owners have a legitimate interest in using their trademarks. 65 Nevertheless, the tribunal concluded its analysis on this question by ruling that:
…under Uruguayan law or international conventions to which Uruguay is a party the trademark holder does not enjoy an absolute right of use, free of regulation, but only an exclusive right to exclude third parties from the market so that only the trademark holder has the possibility to use the trademark in commerce, subject to the State's regulatory power. 66 Thus, the crucial point to note here is that trademarks are not absolute rights and they are subject to the state's regulatory power. In other words, despite the dual nature of the trademarks involved in this dispute (i.e. as both intellectual property and investment assets), the tribunal still recognised the unique status of intellectual property rights in the context of investment agreements. The approach of the tribunal in this regard is in line with the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement which provides in Article 8 that, in formulating or amending their national intellectual property laws, countries can adopt measures 64 necessary to protect public health and nutrition. As the tribunal pointed out in its analysis, "if a food additive is, subsequent to the grant of a trademark, shown to cause cancer, it must be possible for the government to legislate so as to prevent or control its sale notwithstanding the trademark." 67 Consequently, simply because a trademark is an investment asset, it does not mean that it therefore becomes immune from a state's regulatory power. The approach of the tribunal in this regard thus accords with, and preserves, the principle of territoriality.
The public interest
In relation to the second issue i.e. the ability of investment tribunals to consider the broader public interest when resolving investment disputes, the approach of the tribunal in this regard appears to be contrary to the view that "there is scant evidence that many investment tribunals take into account values which might be described as public goods or interests outside of the litigating parties." 68 The approach of the tribunal with regard to considering the broader public interest can be discerned in its analysis of the question concerning whether the measures introduced by Uruguay expropriated Philip Morris' investment.
According to the tribunal, the 80/80 regulation did not constitute an indirect expropriation and it held that a "limitation to 20% of the space available to such purpose could not have a substantial effect on the Claimants' business since it consisted only in a limitation imposed by the law on the modalities of use of the relevant trademarks."
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The tribunal also stated that the SPR did not substantially deprive the claimants of the value, use or enjoyment of their 67 Ibid., para. 269. 68 Frankel, "Interpreting the Overlap", supra n. 15, p. 125. 69 Philip Morris, supra n. 23, para. 276. Ibid., para. 284. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid., para. 286. 73 Ibid., para. 287. 74 Ibid., para. 291.
The tribunal traced the historical development of the police powers doctrine in international investment law and it noted that, while it was not initially recognised by tribunals, "a consistent trend in favour of differentiating the exercise of police powers from indirect expropriation emerged after 2000." 75 As noted by Pellet, the police powers doctrine or the state's right to regulate "accepts that a non-discriminatory taking of property without compensation can be lawful, if decided for a reason of public interest" and "its purpose is to preserve the right of the State to regulate in the public interest." 
WHO's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) to protect its citizens
from the harmful effects of tobacco. 78 Importantly, the tribunal even incorporated a human rights perspective into its decision by noting that the "FCTC is one of the international conventions to which Uruguay is a party guaranteeing the human rights to health; it is of particular relevance in the present case, being specifically concerned to regulate tobacco control."
79
The tribunal took the view that the SPR and the 80/80 regulation satisfied the conditions that must be fulfilled for a state's exercise of its regulatory powers not to constitute indirect expropriation i.e. it was taken bona fide to protect the public welfare (specifically public health in this case), it was non-discriminatory, and it was proportionate. Lilly by Canadian courts based on a failure to satisfy Canada's utility requirement. 82 Eli Lilly alleged that this was an expropriation pursuant to the 79 Ibid., para. 304. 80 Where the specification does not promise a specific result, no particular level of utility is required; a "mere scintilla" of utility will suffice. However, where the specification sets out an explicit "promise", utility will be measured As developed by the Canadian courts, the promise of a patent is determined by examining the patent as a whole (including the claims and specification).
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After identifying the promises, the doctrine requires that these promises be fulfilled either by demonstration or sound prediction and it equates the fulfilment of these promises with the utility requirement in section 2 of the Patent Act. 85 According to the doctrine, if any of the promises are not fulfilled, then the invention would be deemed to have failed to meet the utility requirement. 86 However, in June 2017, just a few months after the tribunal's decision in the dispute between Eli Lilly and Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court held that the promise doctrine is unsound and that its interpretation of the utility requirement is incongruent with the words and scheme of the Patent Act. 87 Importantly, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine conflates the utility requirement (in section 2) with the disclosure requirement (in section 27(3)) of the Patent Act. 88 The merits or otherwise of the Canadian Supreme Court's decision is however not the focus of this paper. It suffices to state here that, under the principle of territoriality in IIPL, a country is free to strengthen or weaken its patentability requirements and thus Canada (either through its parliament or courts) is free to change its mind about the promise doctrine. This paper is instead concerned with the question of whether the application of the promise doctrine prior to June 2017, resulting in the invalidation of a number of patents including 84 Ibid., para. 80. 85 See, AstraZeneca v Apotex, 2017 SCC 36, para. 31. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid., para. 36. 88 Ibid., paras. 43-44. Eli Lilly's pharmaceutical patents, constitutes an expropriation of Eli Lilly's patent.
The crux of Eli Lilly's complaint was that Canadian courts developed the promise doctrine in the mid-2000s after it had been granted its patents and it contended that this was a radical development. 89 Importantly, it also contended that the doctrine is inconsistent with Canada's obligation under NAFTA and that the retroactive application of the doctrine to its patent amounted to, inter alia, an unlawful expropriation under Article 1110 of NAFTA. The tribunal ruled in favour of Canada and it held that Eli Lilly had failed to demonstrate that there had been a radical change in the way Canadian courts construed the utility requirement. 92 The tribunal equally ruled that the invalidation of Eli Lilly's patents was not a breach of Canada's obligations under NAFTA and was therefore not an expropriation. 93 However, the ruling of the tribunal appears to suggest that an investor can challenge the decisions of a country's courts before an investment tribunal even where there has been no denial of justice. 94 A critical discussion of the tribunal's ruling in relation to denial 89 Eli Lilly, supra n. 23, para. 5. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid., para. 6. 92 Ibid., para. 387. 93 Ibid., para. 469. 94 While stressing that an investment tribunal is not an appellate tier in relation to national court decisions, the tribunal stated that, "it is evident that there are distinctions to be made between conduct that may amount to a denial (or gross denial) of justice and other conduct that may also be sufficiently egregious and shocking, such as manifest arbitrariness or of justice is however beyond the scope of this paper as the focus here is on the tribunal's ruling on whether the invalidation of Eli Lilly's patents amounted to an expropriation.
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As was done in part three above, the two issues identified in part two will be used as a metric to determine whether the tribunal's decision indicates that there is any scope for the preservation of the principle of territoriality within the ISDS system.
The incongruence resulting from treating patents as both an investment asset and as an intellectual property right
In relation to the incongruence between the object and purpose of protecting inventions via the patent system and the object and purpose of protecting inventions as investment assets, the tribunal's decision on three questions is quite instructive. The three questions relate to: (1) whether there had been a radical change in the way Canadian courts applied the utility doctrine; (2) whether Eli
Lilly had a legitimate expectation that its patents would not be invalidated; and, (3) whether NAFTA or international patent law requires countries to have a uniform approach to defining the utility requirement.
With regard to the first question, Eli Lilly alleged that the promise doctrine constitutes a radical change from the traditional utility standard which Canada had been applying prior to the adoption of the doctrine by Canadian courts in the mid-2000s and which is still being applied by other parties to NAFTA i.e.
blatant unfairness…As a matter of principle, therefore, having regard to the content of the customary international law minimum standard of treatment, the Tribunal is unwilling to shut the door to the possibility that judicial conduct characterized other than as a denial of justice may engage a respondent's obligations under NAFTA Article 1105…" See, ibid., para. 223. 95 USA and Mexico.
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In response, Canada contended that as the term "useful" is not defined in the Patent Act, its meaning has evolved through judicial jurisprudence and there was therefore no radical change in the law.
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In its ruling, the tribunal acknowledged that the process of the development of the doctrine shows that there had been some change but it ruled that the "change is more incremental and evolutionary than dramatic." 98 Essentially, the tribunal ruled implication, the principle of territoriality). There is nothing in the TRIPS Agreement or NAFTA that prevents a country's court from adopting an interpretive approach that strengthens its patentability requirements in order to address legitimate concerns within the country such as the need to prevent speculative patenting. These developments, while they might appear to be "radical" changes to an investor, are well within the regulatory powers of a state under international patent law. The tribunal's approach in this regard therefore appears to leave the door open for investors to challenge national court decisions 96 Eli Lilly, supra n. 23, para. 227. 97 Ibid., para. 270. 98 Ibid., para. 350. 99 Ibid., para. 387.
that they might view as constituting "radical" changes to previously existing standards. As Howse notes:
On those exceptional but usually very important occasions when high courts reconsider well-established judicial doctrines in the face of social, economic, environmental or other forms of rapid change we experience in the world today they must now beware that any basic or fundamental reorientation of their jurisprudence could force that state's government to pay out millions or even billions to foreign corporations in the guise of an "expropriation"
having occurred. 100
It is suggested here that a preferable approach would have been for the tribunal to recognise a country's regulatory power to change (either through its parliament or its courts) its patent laws to suit its needs and interests. As long as In its decision, the tribunal noted that Eli Lilly's allegation of a violation of its legitimate expectation depended on establishing that there was a radical change in Canada's utility requirement and, since Eli Lilly could not establish that there was a radical change, its allegation in this regard must be dismissed. 108 Nevertheless, the tribunal still noted that every patentee knows that their patents can be challenged before national courts on the grounds of a failure to satisfy patentability requirements. 109 According to the tribunal, Eli Lilly's expectation that its patents would not be invalidated for failure to meet the utility requirement "cannot amount to a legitimate expectation." 110
The tribunal's decision in this regard accords with the principle of territoriality. Patents, like other forms of intellectual property rights, can always be challenged before national courts and they can be invalidated for failure to satisfy the statutory requirements. International intellectual property law also gives countries the freedom to define patentability requirements and the grounds on which a patent can be invalidated in their national law. Simply because a patent is also an investment asset should not change the fact that the patent is just presumptively valid. Thus, an investor cannot legitimately expect that its patents will not be invalidated by the courts.
In relation to the third question i.e. whether NAFTA or international patent law requires countries to have a uniform approach to defining the utility requirement, Eli Lilly contended (in support of its allegation that there had been a radical change in Canada's utility requirement) that Canada's promise doctrine was an outlier when compared with the position in the other parties to NAFTA (i.e. USA and Mexico).
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Eli Lilly also alleged that Canada's "promise utility doctrine constitutes a new and radical departure from the traditional patent law concept of utility as reflected in the laws of many countries."
112
In response, 
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The tribunal's decision in this regard accords with, and preserves, the principle of territoriality. Since there is no treaty that codifies the meaning of the utility requirement, countries are free to define this requirement as they so wish in their national patent laws. There is nothing in the Paris Convention, TRIPS Agreement, or NAFTA, that harmonises the patentability requirements.
Crucially, the TRIPS Agreement and NAFTA only contain minimum (but not harmonised) standards in relation to patentability requirements.
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There is therefore nothing surprising about the fact that different countries might have different definitions with regard to patentability requirements.
The public interest
One of the contentions of Eli Lilly was that the promise doctrine is arbitrary because it, inter alia, served no legitimate public purpose. 117 In Eli Lilly's view, Canada had "failed to identify any credible policy objective advanced by the promise utility doctrine." 118 In response, Canada rejected the view that the doctrine is arbitrary and it contended, among other things, that some of the elements of the doctrine such as requiring patent applicants to demonstrate or soundly predict the utility of an invention at the time of filing is aimed at preventing the granting of patents on the basis of bare speculation. In its ruling in this regard, the tribunal noted that it was necessary to consider Eli Lilly's allegation in this regard (despite finding that there was no radical change in Canada's utility requirement) because an arbitrary or discriminatory measure can violate NAFTA even in the absence of a radical change in the law. 122 However, it held that the decisions of the Canadian courts with regard to the promise doctrine were neither arbitrary nor expropriatory.
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Importantly, the tribunal found that Canada had "asserted a legitimate public policy justification for the promise doctrine." 124 In particular, the tribunal noted that Canada had explained that holding patent applicants to the promises disclosed in their patents discourages overstatements in patent disclosure and is part of the patent bargain. 125 Importantly, in relation to one of the elements of the promise doctrine which prevents patent applicants from submitting evidence to prove utility after the filing of an application, the tribunal stated that, while this might make it difficult for an applicant to identify when all the patentability requirements can be met and when to file its patent application, "this is the consequence of a rational policy approach in Canada, not an indication of arbitrariness in the law" and that it is not the tribunal's role to question the policy choices of Canada. 126 The tribunal's deference to Canada's policy choices in this regard is commendable. The approach of the tribunal in relation to this issue is also in accordance with the principle of territoriality in IIPL. It is important for investment tribunals to recognise and respect the policy choices that countries make (either through their parliament or courts) with regard to their patent laws specifically or intellectual property laws generally. International intellectual property law, especially the TRIPS Agreement, permits countries to adopt policies that are in the public interest and which are aimed at achieving specific societal goals such as preventing speculative patenting, prohibiting the patenting of trivial modifications of previously known medicines, or facilitating access to affordable generic drugs. 127 
Conclusion
This paper does not intend to make any radical suggestions for the reform of the ISDS system 128 and neither does it pretend to have exhaustively examined all the potential ways in which the international investment law regime can impact the principle of territoriality in IIPL. For instance, investors typically rely on other concepts such as the denial of justice and the lack of fair and equitable treatment in support of their claims before investment tribunals. While these other concepts have not been thoroughly examined in this paper, this does not imply that they cannot have an impact on the principle of territoriality in IIPL. Furthermore, the cost of defending an investment dispute 129 and the possibility of being ordered to pay a huge amount of money as compensation 130 to an investor may deter states from implementing measures relating to intellectual property that can subsequently be challenged before an investment tribunal. This paper instead focuses on whether there is still some scope for the preservation of the principle of territoriality in the ISDS system by examining how investment tribunals have construed what constitutes an expropriation in two recent cases involving "intellectual property assets". While one should be wary of jumping to conclusions based on the outcome of only two cases, these two cases provides some basis for cautious optimism. A critical examination of these two cases suggests that there is still some scope for the preservation of the principle of territoriality in the ISDS system although a lot depends on how a tribunal approaches the question of what amounts to an expropriation. A critical reading of the two cases discussed in this paper suggests that, if tribunals adopt a broad interpretive approach when construing bilateral investment treaties and investment chapters of free trade agreements in disputes involving "intellectual property assets," they can arrive at decisions that preserve the regulatory powers 129 It should be noted that even though Uruguay won and Philip Morris lost, the tribunal only ordered Philip Morris to pay $7 million out of the $10.3 million that Uruguay claimed it spent on legal costs. In other words, Uruguay had to bear the cost of the remaining $3.3 million. See, Philip Morris, supra n. 23, paras. 582-588. 130 For instance, in its claim against Canada, Eli Lilly demanded for the sum of CDN $500 million as compensation for the losses it claimed to have suffered as a result of Canada's breach of its obligation under NAFTA. See, Eli Lilly (Notice of Arbitration) (12 September 2013), para. 85. See also, Dreyfuss and Frankel, "From Incentive to Commodity to Asset", supra n. 12, pp. 573-574.
of states whilst simultaneously preventing corporate actors from abusing and misusing a system designed to protect investors with genuine grievances.
There is no rule of international law that prevents investment tribunals from adopting a broad interpretive approach when construing investment treaties. A broad interpretive approach will permit investment tribunals to incorporate relevant principles from other areas of international law such as international intellectual property law and international human rights law when deciding disputes between states and corporate actors. Furthermore, with the current legitimacy crisis confronting the ISDS system, the adoption of a broad interpretive approach that incorporates broader public interests and which respects the legitimate policy choices made by states will go a long way towards enhancing the credibility of investment tribunals as reliable and responsible dispute settlement forums.
